Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Explicit Communication Revisited: Two New Attacks on Authentication Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Proving security protocols with model checkers by data independence techniques
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A Method for Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verification
IPDPS '00 Proceedings of the 15 IPDPS 2000 Workshops on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Secrecy by Typing inSecurity Protocols
TACS '97 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Abstracting Cryptographic Protocols with Tree Automata
SAS '99 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SKEME: a versatile secure key exchange mechanism for Internet
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Completing the picture: soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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Most current cryptographic protocol verifiers meet the state space explosion problem, and have to limit the number of executions of the considered protocol during the verification. To solve these problems, we introduce an abstract representation of cryptographic protocols, based on Prolog rules, and use it to verify secrecy properties of protocols.