Adding time to a logic of authentication
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Intensional specifications of security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
What do we mean by entity authentication?
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Deposit-case attack against secure roaming
ACISP'05 Proceedings of the 10th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
A framework for robust group key agreement
ICCSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part III
Insider attacks and privacy of RFID protocols
EuroPKI'11 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Public Key Infrastructures, Services, and Applications
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Frequently, inventors of an attack desperately try to find reasons why the victim of the attack should have initiated a protocol run with an intruder when it is blatantly obvious that there is no intruder anywhere to be seen but there is a misbehaving insider. Security models where the antagonist is an insider are much more relevant to the electronic commerce scenario which today drives much work on security protocols and cryptography. This is another example of a general problem in security. Too often, the concepts used to discuss security do not fit the security issues we are trying to address.