Design and validation of computer protocols
Design and validation of computer protocols
Computer Networks and ISDN Systems - Special issue on SDL and MSC
MOCHA: Modularity in Model Checking
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Specification and formal verification of security requirements
CompSysTech '04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Computer systems and technologies
Applying SDL to formal analysis of security systems
SDL'03 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on System design
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Every communication system requiring security properties is certainly critical. In order to study the security of communication systems, we have developed a methodology for the application of the formal analysis techniques of communication protocols to the analysis of cryptographic ones. We have extended the design and analysis phases with security properties. Our methodology uses a specification technique based on the HMSC/MSC requirement languages, and translates it into a generic schema for the SDL specification language, which is used for the analysis. Thus, the technique allows the specification of security protocols using a standard formal language and uses Object-Orientation for reusability purposes. The final goal is not only the formal specification of a security system, but to examine the possible attacks, and later use the specification in more complex systems.