Safeware: system safety and computers
Safeware: system safety and computers
Computer
Combining software evidence: arguments and assurance
REBSE '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Realising evidence-based software engineering
Systematic approaches to understanding and evaluating design trade-offs
Journal of Systems and Software
Flexible design of complex high-integrity systems using trade offs
HASE'04 Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE international conference on High assurance systems engineering
Vertical safety interfaces: improving the efficiency of modular certification
SAFECOMP'11 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Computer safety, reliability, and security
A safety case approach to assuring configurable architectures of safety-critical product lines
ISARCS'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Architecting Critical Systems
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The adoption of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in the aerospace industry offers potential benefits of improved flexibility in function allocation, reduced development costs and improved maintainability. However, it requires a new certification approach. The traditional approach to certification is to prepare monolithic safety cases as bespoke developments for a specific system in a fixed configuration. However, this nullifies the benefits of flexibility and reduced rework claimed of IMA-based systems and will necessitate the development of new safety cases for all possible (current and future) configurations of the architecture. This paper discusses a modular approach to safety case construction, whereby the safety case is partitioned into separable arguments of safety corresponding with the components of the system architecture. Such an approach relies upon properties of the IMA system architecture (such as segregation and location independence) having been established. The paper describes how such properties can be assessed to show that they are met and trade-off performed during architecture definition reusing information and techniques from the safety argument process.