A Cryptanalysis of the High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection System

  • Authors:
  • Scott Crosby;Ian Goldberg;Robert Johnson;Dawn Xiaodong Song;David Wagner

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • DRM '01 Revised Papers from the ACM CCS-8 Workshop on Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management
  • Year:
  • 2001

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We describe a weakness in the High Bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) scheme which may lead to practical attacks. HDCPi s a proposed identity-based cryptosystem for use over the Digital Visual Interface bus, a consumer video bus used to connect personal computers and digital display devices. Public/private key pairs are assigned to devices by a trusted authority, which possesses a master secret. If an attacker can recover 40 public/private key pairs that span the module of public keys, then the authority's master secret can be recovered in a few seconds. With the master secret, an attacker can eavesdrop on communications between any two devices and can spoof any device, both in real time. Additionally, the attacker can produce new key pairs not on any key revocation list. Thus the attacker can completely usurp the trusted authority's power. Furthermore, the protocol is still insecure even if all devices' keys are signed by the central authority.