Choice Logic Programs and Nash Equilibria in Strategic Games

Authors:
Marina De Vos;Dirk Vermeir
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
CSL '99 Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop and 8th Annual Conference of the EACSL on Computer Science Logic
Year:
1999

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Abstract

We define choice logic programs as negation-free datalog programs that allow rules to have exclusive-only disjunctions in the head. We show that choice programs are equivalent to semi-negative datalog programs, at least as far as stable models are concerned. We also discuss an application where strategic games can be naturally formulated as choice programs; it turns out that the stable models of such programs capture exactly the set of Nash equilibria.