Bias in the LEVIATHAN Stream Cipher

  • Authors:
  • Paul Crowley;Stefan Lucks

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • FSE '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

We show two methods of distinguishing the LEVIATHAN stream cipher from a random stream using 236 bytes of output and proportional effort; both arise from compression within the cipher. The first models the cipher as two random functions in sequence, and shows that the probability of a collision in 64-bit output blocks is doubled as a result; the second shows artifacts where the same inputs are presented to the key-dependent S-boxes in the final stage of the cipher for two successive outputs. Both distinguishers are demonstrated with experiments on a reduced variant of the cipher.