Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis of a Reduced-Round SC2000

Authors:
Hitoshi Yanami;Takeshi Shimoyama;Orr Dunkelman
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Year:
2002

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Abstract

We analyze the security of the SC2000 block cipher against both differential and linear attacks. SC2000 is a six-and-a-half-round block cipher, which has a unique structure that includes both the Feistel and Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) structures. Taking the structure of SC2000 into account, we investigate one- and two-round iterative differential and linear characteristics. We present two-round iterative differential characteristics with probability 2-58 and two-round iterative linear characteristics with probability 2-56. These characteristics, which we obtained through a search, allowed us to attack four-and-a-half-round SC2000 in the 128-bit user-key case. Our differential attack needs 2103 pairs of chosen plaintexts and 220 memory accesses and our linear attack needs 2115.17 known plaintexts and 242.32 memory accesses, or 2104.32 known plaintexts and 283.32 memory accesses.