Saturation Attacks on Reduced Round Skipjack

  • Authors:
  • Kyungdeok Hwang;Wonil Lee;Sungjae Lee;Sangjin Lee;Jongin Lim

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

This paper describes saturation attacks on reduced-round versions of Skipjack. To begin with, we will show how to construct a 16-round distinguisher which distinguishes 16 rounds of Skipjack from a random permutation. The distinguisher is used to attack on 18(5~22) and 23(5~27) rounds of Skipjack. We can also construct a 20-round distinguisher based on the 16-round distinguisher. This distinguisher is used to attack on 22(1~22) and 27(1~27) rounds of Skipjack. The 80- bit user key of 27 rounds of Skipjack can be recovered with 250 chosen plaintexts and 3 驴 275 encryption times.