A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
SIAM Journal on Computing
Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail-Stop Signatures
Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail-Stop Signatures
Fail-Stop Threshold Signature Schemes Based on Elliptic Curves
ACISP '99 Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: A New Concept
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
New Constructions of Fail-Stop Signatures and Lower Bounds (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Generation of Shared RSA Keys (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Collision-free accumulators and fail-stop signature schemes without trees
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
One-time signatures and Chameleon hash functions
SAC'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
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Security of ordinary digital signature schemes relies on a computational assumption. Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) schemes provide security for a sender against a forger with unlimited computational power by enabling the sender to provide a proof of forgery, if it occurs. In this paper, first we propose a new FSS scheme whose security is based on discrete logarithm modulo a composite number, and integer factorization. We provide a security proof of the scheme, and show that it is as efficient as the most efficient previously known FSS scheme. Next, we construct a Threshold FSS that requires collaboration of t out of n participants to generate a signature and to prove forgery if it occurs. The scheme is equipped with cheater detection (incorrect partial signature) which is essential for an effective proof of forgery in Threshold FSS and only requires trusted authority during pre-key generation.