Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
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Theoretical Computer Science
Non Interference for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
ICALP '00 Proceedings of the 27th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Automatic Verification of Cryptographic Protocols through Compositional Analysis Techniques
TACAS '99 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Reasoning about Cryptographic Protocols in the Spi Calculus
CONCUR '97 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Formal Support for Fault Modelling and Analysis
SAFECOMP '01 Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security
Efficient Finite-State Analysis for Large Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity in a reliable protocol for mobile computing
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM symposium on Applied computing
A tool for the synthesis of cryptographic orchestrators
Proceedings of the Workshop on Model-Driven Security
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The paper analyzes SCEP, the Simple Certificate Enrollment Procedure, a two-way communication protocol to manage the secure emission of digital certificates to network devices. The protocol provides a consistent method of requesting and receiving certificates from different Certification Authorities by offering an open and scalable solution for deploying certificates which can be beneficial to all network devices and IPSEC software solutions.We formally analyze SCEP through a software tool for the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols able to discover, at a conceptual level, attacks against security procedures. Our method of survey contributes towards a better understanding of the structure and aims of a protocol both for developers, analyzers and final users.