An Efficient Two-Party Public Key Cryptosystem Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

  • Authors:
  • Philip D. MacKenzie

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We propose an efficient two-party public key cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, based on the hardness of Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH). Specifically, we show that the two parties together can decrypt ciphertexts, but neither can alone. Our system is based on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. Previous results on efficient threshold cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack required either (1) a strict majority of uncorrupted decryption servers, and thus do not apply to the two-party scenario, or (2) the random oracle assumption, and thus were not proven secure in the "standard" model.