Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning
Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning
On the relation between default and autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
A catalog of complexity classes
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. A)
Extended logic programs as autoepistemic theories
Proceedings of the second international workshop on Logic programming and non-monotonic reasoning
A note on non-monotonic modal logic
Artificial Intelligence
Minimal knowledge problem: a new approach
Artificial Intelligence
Translating default logic into standard autoepistemic logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On embedding default logic into Moore's autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic Logic: Context-Dependent Reasoning
Nonmonotonic Logic: Context-Dependent Reasoning
Embedding Minimal Knowledge into Autoepistemic Logic
AI*IA '97 Proceedings of the 5th Congress of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic logics: meaning and utility
IJCAI'87 Proceedings of the 10th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Nonmonotonic databases and epistemic queries
IJCAI'91 Proceedings of the 12th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Reasoning with minimal belief and negation as failure: algorithms and complexity
AAAI'97/IAAI'97 Proceedings of the fourteenth national conference on artificial intelligence and ninth conference on Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Logical approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning have been developed within different technical settings, thus making it difficult to establish correspondences among them and to identify common underlying principles. In this paper we argue that the most well-known nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms are actually characterized by two closure assumptions: a minimal knowledge assumption and an autoepistemic assumption. We justify this thesis by introducing generalized default logic (GDL), obtained through a simple and natural generalization of Reiter's default logic, which fully captures both closure assumptions. We then analyze the relationship between GDL and nonmonotonic modal logics, in particular Moore's autoepistemic logic and Lifschitz's logic of minimal knowledge and negation as failure, showing the existence of a full correspondence between these modal formalisms and GDL. Such a correspondence gives us a unified reading of nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms in terms of the above two assumptions; in particular, it clarifies the relationship between default and autoepistemic logic.