Adaptive agents in a persistent shout double auction
Proceedings of the first international conference on Information and computation economies
Commodity trading using an agent-based iterated double auction
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
An adaptive agent bidding strategy based on stochastic modeling
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
A multi-attribute utility theoretic negotiation architecture for electronic commerce
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Strategic sequential bidding in auctions using dynamic programming
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed Implementation of General Equilibrium Outcomes
Computational Economics
Using Similarity Criteria to Make Negotiation Trade-Offs
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
A Fuzzy-Logic Based Bidding Strategy for Autonomous Agents in Continuous Double Auctions
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Agent-human interactions in the continuous double auction
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Agent-based service composition through simultaneous negotiation in forward and reverse auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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In this paper, we present an agent which is able to negotiate the buying and selling of imperfectly sustitutable goods in a double auction style market. Two goods are said to be imperfectly substitutable if a buyer can use either of them, but prefers one over the other. For example, an electronics manufacturer using a RAM chip can use many suppliers to do this but may be willing to pay a premium for components with a lower failure rate. We give a formal description of a double-auction style market mechanism for trading such goods, and define the (classical) equilibrium in such an environment. We present the IS-ZIP agent, which is a generalisation of the ZIP agent for double auctions of Cliff and Bruten [3]. It is able to participate in our double auction environment to make purchases or sales of imperfectly substitutable goods. We demonstrate that, when trading a single good, it is equivalent to Preist and van Tol's modification of the ZIP agent [11]. We describe experiments where a group of IS-ZIP agents with different valuations trade repeatedly, and demonstrate that they rapidly converge to our predicted equilibrium. We conclude by relating our work to that of others, particulary work dealing with multi-attribute negotiation, and discussing extensions.