On blind signatures and perfect crimes
Computers and Security
Revokable and versatile electronic money (extended abstract)
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Digital Payment Systems with Passive Anonymity-Revoking Trustees
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
"Indirect Discourse Proof": Achieving Efficient Fair Off-Line E-cash
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Anonymity Control in E-Cash Systems
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Marking: A Privacy Protecting Approach Against Blackmailing
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Distributed "magic ink" signatures
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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To simulate the functionalities of the real cash, one of the important requirements of electronic cash systems is the anonymity of users. Unconditional anonymity, however, is also very well suited to support criminals in blackmailing. Recently K眉gler and Vogt [6] proposed a payment system based on the blind undeniable signature that protects the privacy of the users and defeats blackmailing with the assumption that the victim of a blackmailing can inform the Bank of a blackmailing before delivering the money and transfer the decryption key(i.e. the secret key of the victim) used in confirmation protocol without being detected by a blackmailer. But the assumption that the victim is always able to inform the bank of blackmailing is very impractical in such cases as kidnapping and special impersonation. In this paper, we propose two practical methods that gives the Bank the information about blackmailing and decryption key without any unpractical assumptions.