Using importances in group preference aggregation to block strategic manipulation

  • Authors:
  • Ronald R. Yager

  • Affiliations:
  • Machine Intelligence Institute, Iona College, New Rochelle, NY

  • Venue:
  • Aggregation operators
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We consider the problem of preference aggregation in group decision making. The role of the collaborative imperative used by the group in determining the form of the aggregation function is noted. We focus on one collaborative imperative, called the primal, deriving from participant autonomy, an agent doesn't have to accept a decision by the group it doesn't like. We showed that t-norms and more generally the class of uninorms having zero fixation provide appropriate aggregation operators to implement this primal collaborative imperative. We then discuss the possibility of an agent using a strategic manipulation of its preference information to get its preferred alternative. A mechanism based upon the use of an importance weighting is then suggested for modifying the construction of the group decision function to defend against strategic manipulation.