An access control model for dynamic client-side content

  • Authors:
  • Adam Hess;Kent E. Seamons

  • Affiliations:
  • Brigham Young University, Provo, UT;Brigham Young University, Provo, UT

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

The focus of access control in client/server environments is on protecting sensitive server resources by determining whether or not a client is authorized to access those resources. The set of resources are usually static, and an access control policy associated with each resource specifies who is authorized to access the resource. In this paper, we turn the traditional client/server access control model on its head, and address how to protect the sensitive content that clients disclose to servers. Since client content is dynamically generated at runtime, the usual approach of associating a policy with the resource (content) a priori does not work. In this paper, we propose an access control model for protecting client-side content that is dynamically generated and disclosed at runtime. Our model identifies sensitive content, maps the sensitive content to an access control policy, and establishes the trustworthiness of the server before disclosing the sensitive content to the server. The model targets open systems, where clients and servers do not have preexisting trust relationships. We have implemented the model within TrustBuilder, an architecture for negotiating trust between strangers based on properties other than identity. The implementation is the first example of content-triggered trust negotiation and currently supports access control for sensitive content disclosed by web and email clients.