Price and niche wars in a free-market economy of software agents
Artificial Life
Intelligent Scheduling Systems
Intelligent Scheduling Systems
Numerical Recipes in C: The Art of Scientific Computing
Numerical Recipes in C: The Art of Scientific Computing
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
Engineering of markets and artifacts
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Trading Agents Competing: Performance, Progress, and Market Effectiveness
IEEE Intelligent Systems
A preference processing model for cooperative agents
Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance requirement and loll bids through automated agents
Decision Support Systems
Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Decentralized task allocation using magnet: an empirical evaluation in the logistics domain
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Evolutionary dynamics for designing multi-period auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
An options-based method to solve the composability problem in sequential auctions
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
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A market-based scheduling mechanism allocates resources indexed by time to alternative uses based on the bids of participating agents. Agents are typically interested in multiple time slots of the schedulable resource, with value determined by the earliest deadline by which they can complete their corresponding tasks. Despite the strong complementarities among slots induced by such preferences, it is often infeasible to deploy a mechanism that coordinates allocation across all time slots. We explore the case of separate, simultaneous markets for individual time slots, and the strategic problem it poses for bidding agents. Investigation of the straightforward bidding policy and its variants indicates that the efficacy of particular strategies depends critically on preferences and strategies of other agents, and that the strategy space is far too complex to yield to general game-theoretic analysis. For particular environments, however, it is often possible to derive constrained equilibria through evolutionary search methods.