Farsite: federated, available, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - OSDI '02: Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
Farsite: federated, available, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
The Farsite project: a retrospective
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - Systems work at Microsoft Research
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We describe the design of a Windows file-system directoryservice that ensures the persistence, integrity, privacy,syntactic legality, and case-insensitive uniqueness of thenames it indexes. Byzantine state replication providespersistence and integrity, and encryption imparts privacy.To enforce Windows' baroque name syntax - includingrestrictions on allowable characters, on the terminalcharacter, and on several specific names - we develop acryptographic process, called "exclusive encryption," thatinherently excludes syntactically illegal names and thatenables the exclusion of case-insensitively duplicatenames without access to their plaintext. This processexcludes entire names by mapping the set of allowedstrings to the set of all strings, excludes certain charactersthrough an amended prefix encoding, excludes terminalcharacters through varying the prefix coding by characterindex, and supports case-insensitive comparison of namesby extracting and encrypting case information separately.We also address the issues of hiding name-lengthinformation and access-authorization information, and wereport a newly discovered problem with enforcing case-insensitiveuniqueness for Unicode names.