Penetration Testing: A Duet

  • Authors:
  • Daniel Geer;John Harthorne

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

Penetration testing is the art of finding an opendoor. It is not a science as science depends on falsifiablehypotheses. The most penetration testing can hope for isto be the science of insecurity - not the science of security- inasmuch as penetration testing can at most proveinsecurity by falsifying the hypothesis that any system,network, or application is secure. To be a science ofsecurity would require falsifiable hypotheses that anygiven system, network, or application was insecure,something that could only be done if the number ofpotential insecurities were known and enumerated suchthat the penetration tester could thereby falsify (test) aknown-to-be-complete list of vulnerabilities claimed tonot be present. Because the list of potential insecurities isunknowable and hence unenumerable, no penetrationtester can prove security, just as no doctor can prove thatyou are without occult disease. Putting it as Picasso did,"Art is a lie that shows the truth" and security bypenetration testing is a lie in that on a good day can showthe truth. These incompleteness and proof-by-demonstration characteristics of penetration testing ensurethat it remains an art so long as high rates of technicaladvance remains brisk and hence enumeration ofvulnerabilities an impossibility. Brisk technical advanceequals productivity growth and thereby wealth creation,so it is forbidden to long for a day when penetrationtesting could achieve the status of science.