Secure Information Flow for Concurrent Processes
CONCUR '00 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Dependability then and now: commentary on Donald MacKenzie, "a view from the Sonnenbichl"
ICHC Proceedings of the international conference on History of computing: software issues
Principles of Timing Anomalies in Superscalar Processors
QSIC '05 Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Quality Software
High level specification of non-interference security policies in partitioned MLS systems
CNIS '07 Proceedings of the Fourth IASTED International Conference on Communication, Network and Information Security
Component-based development of dependable systems with UML
Component-Based Software Development for Embedded Systems
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This paper examines the problem of safely integrating independent software components, of different criticality levels, in a single system. We examine the risks of interference between independent software components which share common hardware resources. We propose a definition of safe integration in which only a limited form of interference is tolerated, namely a bounded performance degradation. We show how the definition can be applied to systems modeled as input-output automata, and we compare our model to other notions of noninterference and related concepts.