A note on the inevitability of maximum entropy
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Notes on “A clash of intuitions”
Artificial Intelligence
Probabilistic semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning: a survey
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
On the consistency of defeasible databases
Artificial Intelligence
What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
Artificial Intelligence
Qualitative probabilities: a normative framework for commonsense reasoning
Qualitative probabilities: a normative framework for commonsense reasoning
Default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases: complexity and tractable cases
Artificial Intelligence
Default Reasoning: Causal and Conditional Theories
Default Reasoning: Causal and Conditional Theories
A Maximum Entropy Approach to Nonmonotonic Reasoning
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
Maximum Entropy and Variable Strength Defaults
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A general non-probabilistic theory of inductive reasoning
UAI '88 Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
System Z: A Natural Ordering of Defaults with Tractable Applications to Nonmonotonic Reasoning
Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge
Explaining default intuitions using maximum entropy
Journal of Applied Logic - Special issue on combining probability and logic
Handling uncertainty and defeasibility in a possibilistic logic setting
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
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A generalisation of the maximum entropy (ME) approach to default reasoning [7,8] to cater for variable strength defaults is presented. The assumptions on which the original work was based are reviewed and revised. A new algorithm is presented that is shown to compute the ME-ranking under these more general conditions. The limitations of the revised approach are discussed and a test for the uniqueness of the ME-solution is given. The ME-solutions to several illustrative examples of default reasoning are given, and the approach is shown to handle them appropriately. The conclusion is that the ME-approach can be regarded as providing a benchmark theory of default reasoning against which default intuitions and other default systems may be assessed.