Security Engineering of Lattice-Based Policies

  • Authors:
  • Ciaran Bryce

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
  • Year:
  • 1997

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper describes an algebraic approach to the security engineering of lattice policies. The approach extends earlier lattice and algebraic work, and has two main goals. First, it seeks to model access control policies with anti-symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity exceptions using a lattice, and to propose an information flow security definition for the resulting set (POL) of policies. Second, it supports a constructive approach to policy specification through an algebraic structure (POL, AND, OR, NOT, =,