A multiple bus broadcast protocol resilient to non-cooperative Byzantine faults

Authors:
K. Echtle;A Masum
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
FTCS '96 Proceedings of the The Twenty-Sixth Annual International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing (FTCS '96)
Year:
1996

Citing 12
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Abstract

We describe a reliable broadcast protocol for multiple buses. It utilizes the benefits of a slightly restricted Byzantine fault model. Unlike common fault models we refrain from putting restrictions on the behavior of single node failures (i.e., fail omission assumption). Instead we make the assumption on the overall behavior of a set of faulty system components. By excluding extremely unlikely malicious cooperation we can reach uniform agreement on message delivery among faultless nodes at low cost. In the faultless case the execution time is bound by the maximum duration of a single broadcast message. In the presence of omission, timing and even non-cooperative Byzantine faults, both execution time and message number depend on the properties of the surviving network. In contrast to other known protocols our approach tolerates up to n-2 faulty nodes in a system of n nodes. Moreover, any number of bus faults and bus access unit faults are tolerated, provided that the network is not partitioned.