Proving the adequacy of protection in an operating system

  • Authors:

  • Theodore A. Linden

  • Affiliations:

  • National Security Agency, R115, Ft. George G . Meade, MD

  • Venue:
  • Proceeding of ACM SIGPLAN - SIGOPS interface meeting on Programming languages - operating systems
  • Year:
  • 1973

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Abstract

The best that can be expected from traditional debugging and testing techniques is that the number of bugs will be reduced to a tolerable level. However, programs that either implement or relate to protection in an operating system are examples of programs for which: 1) the number of residual bugs that can be tolerated is zero; 2) it is necessary to know, or at least have convincing objective evidence, that the number of bugs is indeed zero; and 3) the concern extends to bugs which would not arise under normal circumstances and which may be very difficult to find either by testing or by normal use.