A Practical Revocation Scheme for Broadcast Encryption Using Smart Cards

  • Authors:
  • Noam Kogan;Yuval Shavitt;Avishai Wool

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-

  • Venue:
  • SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We present an anti-pirate revocation scheme for broadcastencryption systems (e.g., pay TV), in which the data isencrypted to ensure payment by users. In the systems weconsider, decryption of keys is done on smartcards, and keymanagement is done in-band. Our starting point is a recentscheme of Naor and Pinkas. The basic scheme uses secretsharing to remove up to t parties, is information theoreticsecure against coalitions of size t, and is capable of creatinga new group key. However, with current smartcard technology,this scheme is only feasible for small system parameters,allowing up to about 100 pirates to be revoked beforeall the smartcards need to be replaced.We first present a novel implementation method of theirbasic scheme that distributes the work in novel ways amongthe smartcard, set-top terminal, and center. Based on this,we construct several improved schemes for many statefulrevocation rounds that scale to realistic system sizes. Weallow up to about 10000 pirates to be revoked using currentsmartcard technology before re-carding is needed. Thetransmission lengths of our constructions are on par withthose of the best tree-based schemes. However, our constructionshave much lower smartcard CPU complexity:only O (1) smartcard operations per revocation round, asopposed to a poly-logarithmic complexity of the best tree-basedschemes.We evaluate the system behavior via an exhaustive simulationstudy. Our simulations show that with mild assumptionson the piracy discovery rate, our constructions canperform effective pirate revocation for realistic broadcastencryption scenarios.