The effect of agreements in a game with multiple strategies for cooperation

Authors:
Pedro Mariano;Luís Correia
Affiliations:
Informatics Department, New University of Lisbon, Quinta da Torre, 2829 - 516 CAPARICA, Portugal;Informatics Department, New University of Lisbon, Quinta da Torre, 2829 - 516 CAPARICA, Portugal
Venue:
ICAL 2003 Proceedings of the eighth international conference on Artificial life
Year:
2002

Citing 3
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Abstract

We present a model suited not only for the study of evolution of cooperation but also to study behaviours such as treason and exploitation. This game has multiple Pareto Optimal solutions, which causes shifts in the agent strategies that we can interpret as either treason or exploitation. This requires some form of coordination between agents to avoid penalising behaviours. We present results of our game with and without an agreement model. We show that our game provides rich evolutionary dynamics.