Secure Information Flow and CPS
ESOP '01 Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Trustless Grid Computing in ConCert
GRID '02 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Grid Computing
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Several security-typed languages have recently been proposed to enforce security properties such as confidentiality or integrity by type checking. We propose a new security-typed language, SPL@, that addresses two important limitations of previous approaches. First, existing languages assume that the underlying execution platform is trusted; this assumption does not scale to distributed computation in which a variety of differently trusted hosts are available to execute programs. Our new approach, secure program partitioning, translates programs written assuming complete trust in a single executing host into programs that execute using a collection of variously trusted hosts to perform computation. As the trust configuration of a distributed system evolves, this translation can be performed as necessary for security. Second, many common program transformations do not work in existing security-typed languages; although they produce equivalent programs, these programs are rejected because of apparent information flows. SPL@ uses a novel mechanism based on ordered linear continuations to permit a richer class of program transformations, including secure program partitioning. This report is the technical companion to [ZM00]. It contains expanded discussion and extensive proofs of both the soundness and noninterference theorems mentioned in Section 3.3 of that work.