Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive recovery
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Sustaining Availability of Web Services under Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
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DSN '01 Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (formerly: FTCS)
Byzantine Fault Tolerance Can Be Fast
DSN '01 Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (formerly: FTCS)
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Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
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FAST '03 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
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EW 10 Proceedings of the 10th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Byzantine fault tolerant public key authentication in peer-to-peer systems
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Byzantine fault tolerant public key authentication in peer-to-peer systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Management in peer-to-peer systems
Towards a practical approach to confidential Byzantine fault tolerance
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A new k-anonymous message transmission protocol
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
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COCA is a fault-tolerant and secure on-line certification authority that has been built and deployed both in a local area network and in the Internet. Replication is used to achieve availability; proactive recovery with threshold cryptography is used for digitally signing certificates in a way that defends against mobile adversaries which attack, compromise, and control one replica for a limited period of time before moving on to another. Relatively weak assumptions characterize environments in which COCA''s protocols will execute correctly. No assumption is made about execution speed and message delivery delays; channels are expected to exhibit only intermittent reliability; and with 3t+1 COCA servers up to t may be faulty or compromised. The result is a system with inherent defenses to certain denial of service attacks because, by their very nature, weak assumptions are difficult for attackers to invalidate. In addition, traditional techniques, including request authorization, resource management based on segregation and scheduling different classes of requests, as well as caching results of expensive cryptographic operations further reduce COCA''s vulnerability to denial of service attacks. Results from experiments in a local area network and the Internet allow a quantitative evaluation of the various means COCA employs to resist denial of service attacks.