On a network creation game

  • Authors:
  • Alex Fabrikant;Ankur Luthra;Elitza Maneva;Christos H. Papadimitriou;Scott Shenker

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Division, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;Computer Science Division, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;Computer Science Division, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;Computer Science Division, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We introduce a novel game that models the creation of Internet-like networks by selfish node-agents without central design or coordination. Nodes pay for the links that they establish, and benefit from short paths to all destinations. We study the Nash equilibria of this game, and prove results suggesting that the "price of anarchy" [4] in this context (the relative cost of the lack of coordination) may be modest. Several interesting: extensions are suggested.