Cryptanalysis of the Wu--Varadhrajan fair exchange protocol

  • Authors:
  • Olivier Markowitch;Shahrokh Saeednia

  • Affiliations:
  • Université Libre de Bruxelles, Département d'Informatique, Boulevard du Triomphe - CP212, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium;Université Libre de Bruxelles, Département d'Informatique, Boulevard du Triomphe - CP212, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • Information Processing Letters
  • Year:
  • 2003

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.89

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper we present an attack on a fair exchange protocol proposed by Wu and Varadharajan. We show that, after two executions of the protocol, a dishonest participant can collect enough information in order to obtain some secret information of the other participant. This precisely allows him to compute the final signature of the other participant in all subsequent executions of the protocol, without disclosing his own signature.