Dynamic access control: preserving safety and trust for network defense operations
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In this paper we define and provide a general constructionfor a class of policies we call dynamic policies.In mostexisting systems, policies are implemented and enforced bychanging the operational parameters of shared system objects.These policies do not account for the behavior of the entire system, and enforcing these policies can have unexpectedinteractive or concurrent behavior.We present a policyspecification, implementation, and enforcement methodologybased on formal models of interactive behavior andsatisfiability of system properties.We show that changingthe operational parameters of our policy implementationentities does not affect the behavioral guarantees specifiedby the properties.We demonstrate the construction of dynamicaccess control policies based on safety property specificationsand describe an implementation of these policiesin the Seraphim active network architecture.We presentexamples of reactive security systems that demonstrate thepower and dynamism of our policy implementations.Wealso describe other types of dynamic policies for informationflow and availability based on safety, liveness, fairness,and other properties.We believe that dynamic policies areimportant building blocks of reactive security solutions foractive networks.