Complex reactive real time systems and the safety case
SCS '04 Proceedings of the 9th Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 47
Bi-directional safety analysis of product lines
Journal of Systems and Software
Adding Dependability Analysis Capabilities to the MARTE Profile
MoDELS '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems
Modeling of secure data extraction in ETL processes using UML 2.0
AsiaMS '07 Proceedings of the IASTED Asian Conference on Modelling and Simulation
Towards evidence-based architectural design for safety-critical software applications
Architecting dependable systems IV
A comparison of two approaches to safety analysis based on use cases
ER'07 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Conceptual modeling
Comparing safety analysis based on sequence diagrams and textual use cases
CAiSE'10 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Advanced information systems engineering
A dependability profile within MARTE
Software and Systems Modeling (SoSyM)
Automatic translation form requirements model into use cases modeling on UML
ICCSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part III
Threat scenario-based security risk analysis using use case modeling in information systems
Security and Communication Networks
Dependability modeling and analysis of software systems specified with UML
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A UML-based method for risk analysis of human-robot interactions
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems
Comparing risk identification techniques for safety and security requirements
Journal of Systems and Software
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Abstract: Elicitation of requirements for safety critical aero-engine control systems is dependent on the capture of core design intent and the systematic derivation of requirements addressing hazardous deviations from that intent. Derivation of these requirements is inextricably linked to the safety assessment process. Conventional civil aerospace practice (as advocated by guidelines such as ARP4754 and ARP4671) promotes the application of Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) to sets of statements of functional intent. Systematic hazard analysis of scenario-based requirements representations is less well understood. This paper discusses the principles and problems of hazard analysis and proposes an approach to conducting hazard analysis on use case requirements representations. Using the approach, it is possible to justifiably derive hazard-mitigation use cases as first class requirements from systematic hazard analysis of core design intent scenarios. An industrial example is used to illustrate the technique.