Concurrency control in trusted database management systems: a survey
ACM SIGMOD Record
An efficient multiversion algorithm for secure servicing of transaction reads
CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
Formal query languages for secure relational databases
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Rewriting Histories: Recovering from Malicious Transactions
Distributed and Parallel Databases - Security of data and transaction processing
Correctness Criteria for Multilevel Secure Transactions
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Multilevel secure rules and its impact on the design of active database systems
BNCOD'03 Proceedings of the 20th British national conference on Databases
Ensuring atomicity of multilevel transactions
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
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This paper sets out a second order modal logic for reasoning about multilevel security in probabilistic systems. We present a possible world semantics and prove that the logic is sound with respect to it. The semantics is novel in treating probability measures themselves as possible worlds. We give a syntactic definition of security and show that the semantic interpretation of our syntactic definition is equivalent to an earlier independently motivated characterization, Probabilistic Noninterference ([141). We also look at a syntactic representation of Grays Applied Flow Model (a special case of McLean's Flow Model, given in [25]), and discuss the relation between these characterizations of security andbetween their usefulness in security analysis. We give a syntactic description of a round-robin server and sketch the formal proof of its security.