Preventing Denial and Forgery of Causal Relationships in Distributed Systems

  • Authors:
  • Micheal Reiter;Li Gong

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 1993

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Abstract

In a distributed system, it is often important to detect the causal relationships between events, where event el is causally before event e2 if e1 happened before e2 and could possibly have affected the occurrence of e2. In this paper we argue that detecting causal relationships among events can be important for security, in the sense that it may be essential to the correct implementation of a security policy that a process be able to determine if two events are causally related, and if so, how. We formulate attacks on causality in terms of causal denial and forgery, formalize possible securitygoals with respect to causality, and present simple algorithms to attain these goals in some situations,