A Model for Secure Protocols and Their Compositions

Authors:
Nevin Heintz;J. D. Tygar
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Year:
1994

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Abstract

We give a formal model of protocol security. Our model allows us to reason about the security of protocols, and considers issues of beliefs of agents, time, and secrecy. We prove a composition theorem which allows us to state sufficient conditions on two secureprotocols A and B such that they may be combined to form a new secure protocol C'. Moreover, we give counter-examples to show that when the conditions are not met, the protocol C may not be secure.