Safety Analysis in Formal Specification
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume II
Hazard Analysis in Formal Specification
SAFECOMP '99 Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Computer Computer Safety, Reliability and Security
Reliability assessment through probabilistic refinement
Nordic Journal of Computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The paper presents an extension of the action system formalism to reason about probabilistic systems which can be implemented in a parallel or distributed manner. We focus on modelling safety issues for such systems. We start from a sequential description of the problem where the level of overall system safety is given. We data refine an initial specification by introduction of a fault tolerance mechanism. Proving data refinement gives us an achievable quantitative assessment of the system safety. Next we transform the system to permit a parallel implementation. The result is a specification in the form of an action system which meets the requirements of safety and can be implemented in parallel fashion. We illustrate the technique by designing a system that models data transmission over unreliable media with triple modular redundancy arrangement.