Safety Analysis Techniques for Validating Formal Models During Verification
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Experience has shown that in computer based safety-critical systems, faults introduced during the phase of software requirements analysis can and do cause accidents. In this paper, we present an approach for integrating the activities of requirements analysis and safety analysis. The aim of safety analysis is to determine the risk associated with requirements specifications and assess whether this is acceptable within the context of system risk. The advantage of conducting the safety analysis during the early phases of software development is that safety related errors are less likely to propagate through to subsequent phases of development. The applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated by conducting the safety analysis of an example based on a train set crossing. The example illustrates how the approach to safety analysis supports verification within a formal model of the train set system and how the validation of the formal model is performed.