Resettable zero-knowledge (extended abstract)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We introduce the notion of Resettable Zero-Knowledge (rZK), a new security measure for cryptographic protocols which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge. In essence, an rZK protocol is one that remains zero knowledge even if an adversary can interact with the prover many times, each time resetting the prover to its initial state and forcing him to use the same random tape. Under general complexity assumptions, which hold for example if the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard, we construct (non-constant round) Resettable Zero-Knowledge proof-systems for NP constant-round Resettable Witness-Indistinguishable proof-systems for NP constant-round Resettable Zero-Knowledge arguments for NP in the public key model where verifiers have fixed, public keys associated with them. In addition to shedding new light on what makes zero knowledge possible (by constructing ZK protocols that use randomness in a dramatically weaker way than before), rZK has great relevance to applications. Firstly, we show that rZK protocols are closed under parallel and concurrent execution and thus are guaranteed to be secure when implemented in fully asynchronous networks, even if an adversary schedules the arrival of every message sent. Secondly, rZK protocols enlarge the range of physical ways in which provers of a ZK protocols can be securely implemented, including devices which cannot reliably toss coins on line, nor keep state between invocations. (For instance, because ordinary smart cards with secure hardware are resettable, they could not be used to implement securely the provers of classical ZK protocols, but can now be used to implement securely the provers of rZK protocols.)