Multi-component contingent auction (MCCA): a procurement mechanism for dynamic formation of supply networks

  • Authors:
  • Jin Baek Kim;Arie Segev

  • Affiliations:
  • F402 Haas School of Business, Berkeley, CA;F598 Haas School of Business, Berkeley, CA

  • Venue:
  • ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a procurement mechanism for selecting optimal supplier combination when the suppliers have interoperability and cost dependency issue. The proposed mechanism, named Multi-Component Contingent Auction(MCCA), guarantees that the outcome is the combination of the suppliers with the minimum total cost who can work together. The core of the MCCA is a special form of bid: contingent bid. Contingent bids provide the suppliers with a way to express incompatibility and cost dependency. Suppliers can also implement a package bid by submitting multiple contingent bids. Therefore, the MCCA can be considered as a super set of the combinatorial auction.A major problem in the MCCA is the number of computations required for winner determination. We propose a winner determination algorithm that alleviates this computational burden and compare its performance with the depth-first tree search algorithm.