Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
Risk and expectations in a-priori time allocation in multi-agent contracting
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Decision Processes in Agent-Based Automated Contracting
IEEE Internet Computing
Bidtree Ordering in IDA* Combinatorial Auction Winner-Determination with Side Constraints
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Solving combinatorial auctions with temporal constraints in economic agents
Solving combinatorial auctions with temporal constraints in economic agents
A Multi-Agent Negotiation Testbed for Contracting Tasks with Temporal and Precedence Constraints
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
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We discuss a solution to the winner determination problem which takes into account not only costs but also risk aversion of the agent that accepts the bids and works for tasks that have time and precedence constraints. We develop an equivalent unit approach to the group of tasks to analyze the system and use Expected Utility Theory as the basic mechanism for decision-making. Our theoretical and experimental analysis shows that Expected Utility is especially useful for choosing between cheap-but-risky and costly-but-safe bids. Moreover, we show how bids with similar costs and similar probabilities of being successfully completed but different time windows can be efficiently selected or rejected.