Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies
Communications of the ACM
Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Electronic commerce: a managerial perspective
Electronic commerce: a managerial perspective
The Economics of Electronic Commerce
The Economics of Electronic Commerce
Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda
Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda
Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook
Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook
Key dimensions of facilitators and inhibitors for the strategic use of information technology
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Game theory accepts the expected utility hypothesis and reduces roles to the "informed" and the "uninformed" player in order to facilitate the process of constructing mathematical models. When quality is known to the seller, but not to the buyer, private markets can be modeled as a screening game, and public exchanges as a signaling game. In a private market, the buyer moves first by revealing acceptable quality. In a public exchange, the seller moves first by publicizing product information. Adoption of the technology will ultimately depend on perception of the game and payoffs relative to risks. Price competition is a significant negative externality, and opportunistic representations a real danger. When search costs are low, scope for differentiation limited, and information about quality is incomplete or imperfect, the conditions for a lemon's market are fulfilled. A focus on commodities, global reach, and building a positive brand image for Internet business-to-business (B2B) in general should prove effective.