An Agent-Based Mechanism for Autonomous Multiple Criteria Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions
Decision Support Systems
A unified framework for multiple criteria auction mechanisms
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
A fuzzy TOPSIS based approach for e-sourcing
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preference-based English reverse auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Preference-oriented QoS-based service discovery with dynamic trust and reputation management
Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Multi-attribute reverse auctions have been proposed as market institutions for "electronic request for quotation" buying processes. The choice of a multi-attribute auction institution for corporate sourcing is a challenge for the auctioneer in terms of utility maximization and allocational efficiency. The authors report on a computer-based laboratory experiment in a solesourcing scenario of a single, indivisible object and investigate whether a multi-attribute reverse English and a multi-attribute reverse Vickrey auction institution lead to identical outcomes with respect to the buyer's utility, suppliers' profits and allocational efficiency. The results show no significant difference in suppliers' profits. However, the English auction institution leads to both higher allocational efficiency and buyer's utility and is thus recommendable to corporate buyers. The documented breakdown of the outcome equivalence of the two auction institutions is attributed to bidders deviating from the dominant bidding strategy. The deviations are analyzed and explained by learning effects.