SOSP '89 Proceedings of the twelfth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Optimal privacy and authentication on a portable communications system
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A logic for modeling the dynamics of beliefs in cryptographic protocols
ACSC '01 Proceedings of the 24th Australasian conference on Computer science
On the design of security protocols for mobile communications
ACISP '96 Proceedings of the First Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
Formal verification: an imperative step in the design of security protocols
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Cryptographic protocols are used to achieve secure communication over insecure networks. Weaknesses in such protocols are hard to identify, as they can be the result of subtle design flaws. Formal verification techniques provide rigid and thorough means to evaluate security protocols. This paper demonstrates the process of formal verification by applying a logic to a security protocol intended for use in mobile communications. As a result of the verification, 8 failed protocol goals are identified. Further, a new attack on the protocol is outlined. The presence of weaknesses in published protocols highlights the importance of formal verification to prevent insecure protocols reaching the public domain.