Cryptanalysis of anonymous channel protocol for large-scale area in wireless communications

Authors:
A. M. Barbancho;A. Peinado
Affiliations:
Dept. Ingeniería de Comunicaciones, E.T.S. Ingeniería de Telecomunicación, Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Teatinos, 29071 Málaga, Spain;Dept. Ingeniería de Comunicaciones, E.T.S. Ingeniería de Telecomunicación, Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Teatinos, 29071 Málaga, Spain
Venue:
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Year:
2003

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Abstract

The authentication and anonymous channel protocol for large-scale area in wireless communications proposed in [Proc. Sixth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC'01), 3-5 (2001) 36] by Lin-Jan is analyzed, proving that it is not secure. More precisely, fake anonymous channel tickets can be easily generated allowing nonauthorized users to be validated by the Visiting Network. Unlike it was claimed in [Proc. Sixth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC'01), 3-5 (2001) 36], the security of this protocol does not rely on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over the finite field GF(p), p being a prime.