Perfectly secure message transmission
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Revisited
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Optimal message transmission protocols with flexible parameters
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Two-Step hierarchical protocols for establishing session keys in wireless sensor networks
ICESS'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Embedded Software and Systems
Forward secure communication in wireless sensor networks
SPC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Security in Pervasive Computing
Optimal one round almost perfectly secure message transmission (short paper)
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Secure message transmission in asynchronous directed graphs
INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
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Secure communication guaranteeing reliability, authenticity, and privacy in sensor networks with active adversaries is a challenging research problem since asymmetric key cryptosystems are not suitable for sensor nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. In most proposed secure communication protocols, sensor nodes need to contact the base station to get a session key first if two sensor nodes want to establish a secure communication channel (e.g., SPINS). In several environments, this may be impractical. In this paper, we study key agreement protocols for which two sensor nodes (who do not necessarily have a shared key from the key predistribution phase) could establish a secure communication channel against active adversaries (e.g., denial of service attacks) without the involvement of the base station.