On the security of the verifiably-encrypted signature scheme of Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham

Authors:
F. Hess
Affiliations:
Technical University of Berlin, Faculty II, Institute of Mathematics, Secr. MA8-1, Straße des 17. Juni 136, 10623 Berlin, Germany
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2004

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Abstract

We discuss the security of the verifiably-encrypted signature scheme of Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham. It is quite realistic to allow adversaries access to adjudication oracles for different users but the same adjudicator. This presents an extension of the security model considered by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham and we describe an efficient attack on their scheme in that model. We then show how to obtain security in this extended model by applying a small modification to their scheme.