A Methodology to Detect and Characterize Kernel Level Rootkit Exploits Involving Redirection of the System Call Table

  • Authors:
  • John Levine;Julian Grizzard;Henry Owen

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-

  • Venue:
  • IWIA '04 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Information Assurance Workshop (IWIA'04)
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

There is no standardized methodology at present tocharacterize rootkits that compromise the security ofcomputer systems. The ability to characterize rootkitswill provide system administrators with information sothat they can take the best possible recovery actions andmay also help to detect additional instances and preventthe further installation of the rootkit allowing the securitycommunity to react faster to new rootkit exploits. Thereare limited capabilities at present to detect rootkits, but inmost cases these capabilities only indicate that a system isinfected without identifying the specific rootkit. Wepropose a mathematical framework for classifying rootkitexploits as existing, modifications to existing, or entirelynew. An in-depth analysis of a particular type of kernelrootkit is conducted in order to develop acharacterization. As a result of this characterization andanalysis, we propose some new methods to detect thisparticular class of rootkit exploit.