Honeypots: Practical Means to Validate Malicious Fault Assumptions

Authors:
Marc Dacier;Fabien Pouget;Hervé Debar
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
PRDC '04 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC'04)
Year:
2004

Citing 0
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Abstract

In this paper, we report on an experiment run with several honeypots for 4 months. The motivation of this work resides in our wish to use data collected by honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant systems. This work in progress establishes the foundations for a feasibility study into that direction. After a review of the state of the art with respect to honeypots, we present our test bed, discuss results obtained and lessons learned Avenues for future work are also proposed.