Storing a Sparse Table with 0(1) Worst Case Access Time
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Analysis and simulation of a fair queueing algorithm
SIGCOMM '89 Symposium proceedings on Communications architectures & protocols
IEEE INFOCOM '92 Proceedings of the eleventh annual joint conference of the IEEE computer and communications societies on One world through communications (Vol. 2)
Random early detection gateways for congestion avoidance
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Efficient fair queueing using deficit round robin
SIGCOMM '95 Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Dynamics of random early detection
SIGCOMM '97 Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '97 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '98 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Promoting the use of end-to-end congestion control in the Internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
WF2Q: worst-case fair weighted fair queueing
INFOCOM'96 Proceedings of the Fifteenth annual joint conference of the IEEE computer and communications societies conference on The conference on computer communications - Volume 1
Priority encoding transmission
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory - Part 1
Feedback control for router congestion resolution
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Window-games between TCP flows
Theoretical Computer Science
Game-Theoretic analysis of internet switching with selfish users
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users
Theoretical Computer Science
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Congestion is a natural phenomenon in any network queuing system, and is unavoidable if the queuing system is operated near capacity. In this paper we study how to set the rules of a queuing system so that all the users have a self-interest in controlling congestion when it happens.Routers in the internet respond to local congestion by dropping packets. But if packets are dropped indiscriminately, the effect can be to encourage senders to actually increase their transmission rates, worsening the congestion and destabilizing the system. Alternatively, and only slightly more preferably, the effect can be to arbitrarily let a few insistent senders take over most of the router capacity.We approach this problem from first principles: a router packet-dropping protocol is a mechanism that sets up a game between the senders, who are in turn competing for link capacity. Our task is to design this mechanism so that the game equilibrium is desirable: high total rate is achieved and is shared widely among all senders. In addition, equilibrium should be reestablished quickly in response to changes in transmission rates. Our solution is based upon auction theory: in principle, although not always in practice, we drop packets of the highest-rate sender, in case of congestion. We will prove the game-theoretic merits of our method. We'll also describe a variant of the method with some further advantages that will be supported by network simulations.